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Abstract
We know that the Dáil is dominated by the government. From 2010 to 2016
there was a clamour for change, which ultimately led to significant reforms of
the Oireachtas, and specifically the Dáil. In this article we show that the basis
for the weakness of the Dáil was the government’s control of the legislative
agenda. This article tracks the changes that were made, and we make an early
assessment of them. However, firm conclusions are difficult to draw because
of the extent to which the strengthening of the Dáil is a function of the weak
position of the current minority government.
Keywords: Dáil reform, parliament, agenda setting, agenda control, Ceann
Comhairle
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Introduction
Endemic problems in the Irish political system were brought into
sharp focus by the economic crisis from 2008. Long-rehearsed
arguments about the weaknesses of parliament in Ireland came to the
fore quickly and formed an important part of the political reform
debate, which was especially prevalent during the 2011 general
election. Political reform proposals were produced by all of the
political parties, with many advocating extensive reforms of the Dáil.
The promised reforms were slow to materialise and although political
reform, and specifically Dáil reform, had drifted substantially down
the agenda in the months leading up to the 2016 general election, the
outgoing government enacted a number of discrete, but potentially
significant, changes to the operation of business in parliament. 
Internationally, the processes of how, and reasons why, parlia -
mentary procedures are reformed are subject to renewed interest
(Sieberer et al., 2011). In Ireland political fragmentation and a
minority government after the 2016 election provided the impetus for
further attention to Dáil reform. A Sub-Committee on Dáil Reform
was established and its final report made a series of recommendations,
many of which have been implemented. This article contributes to this
growing literature and is guided by two key questions:
i. What were the critical weaknesses of the Dáil?
ii. How have the reforms implemented over the last two Dáil terms
ameliorated the weakness of parliament in Ireland?
In the next section we provide a robust diagnosis of the weaknesses of
the Dáil, drawing from the international literature on parliaments.
The focus is on agenda-setting powers and the selection procedure for
the speaker (chair) of parliament (Ceann Comhairle). The
classification of agenda-setting powers by Tsebelis & Rasch (2011) is
used to structure the discussion. The article then traces the evolution
of the debate on Dáil reform during the economic crisis from 2008.
The political context is essential to understanding why long-mooted
reforms were eventually implemented. MacCarthaigh & Manning
(2010, p. 31) point out that changes in the conduct of Dáil business
were ‘slow to come and usually grudgingly conceded’. This section
provides the background to the changes that created a viable
environment in which parliamentary reform could be enacted. The
final section documents the reforms implemented during each Dáil
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term and provides an evaluation of how the reforms have changed
parliamentary business. 
A comparative assessment of the basis of the ‘puny’ parliament
Though much of the popular attention on the failings of the Irish
political system focuses on the electoral system and the whip system,
research and public analysis of parliament in Ireland have tended to
focus on the dominance of the executive over parliament: in essence
the Dáil is unable to adequately fulfil many of the functions expected
of a national parliament (O’Malley, 2011). These functions include
powers of appointment and dismissal, the power to scrutinise the
executive and the power to make laws. In addition to their specific
powers, parliaments also fulfil other important functions, including
representation and legitimacy. The analysis proceeds from here by
focusing on the idea of the Dáil as a weak parliament.
Parliamentary agenda control can be regarded as the single most
important institutional determinant of parliamentary power (Koss,
2015). Here we operationalise this as the ability of parliament to
choose its own chairperson and to set its own agenda. The role of
parliament in the legislative process is dealt with more substantively by
Lynch, in this issue, in an article which is focused on reforms of the
committee system.
The Ceann Comhairle
Parliaments across Europe elect their chair by secret ballot, thus giving
parliamentarians more scope to select a chair of their preference. In
the UK a secret ballot for the Speaker of Parliament has been in place
for a number of years and this is also the case in other Westminster-
style parliaments, including Canada and Australia. A secret ballot
reinforces the idea that the speaker is a wholly independent office
holder, with no political obligations to the government of the day.
In addition, there is an argument that the Ceann Comhairle, as
chair of the house, should be as neutral as possible and command the
respect of as many members as possible. Internationally, experience
has shown that the more difficult it is to become presiding officer, the
more neutral the person so selected will be. The idea is that the higher
the threshold for election, the more the individual selected will be a
product of the whole house, as distinct from being the product of a
faction or coalition of factions within the chamber.
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Agenda setting
Agenda-setting powers include institutional structures (the rules and
procedures which regulate the interaction between the legislature and
the executive) and positional discretion, which is the centrality of the
formal agenda setter (which relates to the policy positions of the
formal agenda setter compared to other legislators, including the
extent to which other legislators are broadly united or fragmented
(Tsebelis & Rasch, 2011, p. 1)). 
Institutional sources of agenda-setting power are rules which
determine what set of proposed legislation will be considered by
parliament, how it is considered, including the time given to debates,
and the manner in which decisions are taken. Positive agenda-setting
powers ensure consideration of proposals; negative powers prevent or
restrict consideration of proposals (Krehbiel, 1992; Tsebelis & Rasch,
2011, p. 5). While governments tend to be agenda setters in
parliament, the extent of their agenda-setting powers varies across
parliamentary democracies; the weaker its agenda-setting powers, the
more influence we expect parliament to have over policy and
legislative outcomes. 
Agenda control can be either centralised or decentralised (Koss,
2015, p. 1,064). If we consider a spectrum depicting fully centralised to
fully decentralised, agenda-setting power helps to demonstrate how
instruments work to either give or remove choices from certain actors.
Where agenda-setting power is fully centralised, only one actor (the
agenda setter) can make proposals or propose amendments to
proposals; that same agenda setter decides when to propose them to
parliament and the length of time for which parliament will consider
them; parliament has the power to either approve or reject (but cannot
amend) the proposal (closed rule). On the other hand, where agenda-
setting powers are fully decentralised, parliament decides what
business is on the agenda, the right to propose legislation or
amendments lies with individual members, all members may table
amendments to proposals, and voting takes place on the bill and
amended versions of the bill. In the first case, the agenda setter – the
government – has almost full control over policy outcomes;
government makes proposals and if, for example, parliament does not
like one aspect of its proposals, it must reject the full proposal. At the
other end of the spectrum, no actor has agenda-setting power and it
may be difficult for any proposals to be approved by parliament. Most
parliaments therefore lie somewhere in the middle of this spectrum;
the Dáil has always been placed closer to the ‘centralised’ end (see
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Döring, 1995). Indeed, Garritzmann (2017), in a study of opposition
power in parliamentary democracies, located Ireland at zero on a scale
of zero to one, where for comparative purposes Austria and Belgium
were both ranked at 0.86.
Tsebelis & Rasch (2011, p. 6) group instruments of agenda-setting
power into five categories:
i. timetable and schedule power; 
ii. proposal rights and gatekeeping rules; 
iii. closed and restrictive rules; 
iv. expansive rules and sequencing rules; 
v. vote counting and voting order rules.
Using this classification, we can explore their impacts in more specific
detail. Timetable and schedule control refers to who holds the power
to schedule issues and control the legislature’s timetable. The actor
who fixes the schedule of debates has the power to prioritise certain
proposals over others. Döring (1995) ranked parliaments on a
spectrum from ‘very strong government control’ to less and less
government control of the right to set the plenary agenda. At one end,
government sets the plenary agenda, including the proposals on the
agenda, the order in which business is taken and the time allocated to
debates. At the other extreme, parliament, by a vote or some other
mechanism, sets the agenda and government has no special
prerogatives. In many parliaments the plenary agenda is set by a
presidium or a business committee; where this is the case, the extent
of government control depends on the decision rule in this presidium. 
The decision rule can include: the government having an automatic
weighted majority on the decision-making body; decision by a formal
vote; decision made by unanimous agreement and, if this cannot be
achieved, by the speaker. Finally, where a government has the right, ex
post, to correct the decision of the presidium, it has greater control
over the agenda; where this is explicitly ruled out, government control
is diminished. Döring (1995, p. 224) placed countries on a seven-point
spectrum from more government control to less government control
(see Table 1), and listed Ireland and the UK as the two most
centralised West European parliaments, while the Netherlands
occupied the position of least centralised parliament. The ensuing
decades have witnessed considerable parliamentary reform and later
in this article we evaluate how far recent reforms have changed the
position of the Dáil on this spectrum. 
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Agenda control is also determined through authority to restrict time
for debate and impose allocation of time motions. This can include the
right to restrict the time during which a proposal can be discussed
before a decision is taken, which can effectively make it difficult to
discuss amendments proposed by the opposition (Rasch, 2014, p. 463;
Tsebelis & Rasch, 2011). Döring (1995) ranked parliaments on the
same spectrum depending on the extent to which the government
possesses this instrument. At one end, where agenda control is
centralised, the government may use its simple majority to unilaterally
place limits on the time for a debate, including ruling that all stages of
the legislative process for a bill be taken together. Where agenda
control is less centralised, any limits on the time for debate must be
agreed in advance according to a set of rules. Where the agenda setter
has least control and is therefore decentralised, there is no such
instrument available (Table 2).
In the 1995 analysis the Dáil was classified in the category with most
government control for this instrument, as can be seen from Table 2.
Dáil reforms since 2011: Pathway to power for the ‘puny’ parliament? 43
I
France, Greece, 
Ireland, UK 
II
Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany,
Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Norway,
Portugal, Spain,
Switzerland
III
Finland, Netherlands,
Sweden, Ireland (2016,
with further change
possible)
Table 2: Authority to impose allocation of time motion
Spectrum: More government control – Less government  control
Source: Döring (1995, p. 240–1).
Government may use its
simple majority to
unilaterally place limits
on time for a debate,
including an order that
all stages and the final
vote are taken at one
time; there are no rules
(e.g. minimum time
between stages) to
prevent this 
Limitation of the time
for debate may be
agreed in advance
according to a set of
rules but may not be
unilaterally imposed,
e.g. limitation of time
may require a
supermajority or mutual
agreement between
parties in the
President’s Conference
No rule which allows
closure or advance
limitation of debate; if a
bill is urgent the
government must use
the normal procedures
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In the Dáil the government has controlled the agenda by using its
majority to guillotine debates at will, a point which became especially
controversial during the thirty-first Dáil term.
The second item on the Tsebelis & Rasch (2011) list is proposal
rights and gatekeeping rules. Proposal rights can lie exclusively with
the agenda setter: they may be assigned to government and political
groups in parliament or to individual members of parliament. A
gatekeeping rule effectively restricts the proposal rights of actors other
than the agenda setter. Gatekeeping rules have been described as ‘a
veto without an override provision’ (Krehbiel, 2004, p. 116).
Proposal rights for actors other than the government may be
limited in a formal way. For example, the number of proposals which
they may place on the agenda may be restricted, as well as the time
slots available to have them considered by parliament. Or the right to
propose certain types of bills (e.g. a bill to amend the Constitution, a
bill involving the appropriation of public funds or imposition of
taxation) may be restricted by rules of procedure. It must also be
remembered that while proposal rights may be assigned to
governments and groups, government often enjoys a de facto
monopoly of policy initiation, in part because it has the civil service at
its disposal (Tsebelis & Rasch, 2011). Even if members of parliament
have extensive rights of proposal, they are limited by resource and
capacity constraints (e.g. little or no access to legal advice, policy
advice or legal drafting). Returning to Döring’s (1995) classification
system, high level of government control in this instance would mean
that the government has exclusive, or close to exclusive, rights to
propose legislation while the opposite end of the spectrum would see
opposition and government parties have equal proposal rights. 
Proceeding to item three, closed and restrictive rules on the right to
propose amendments, under fully closed rules, no actor other than the
proponent may table amendments to a bill: i.e. government asks
parliament to accept or reject (but not to propose amendments to) a
bill. Restrictive rules permit actors to propose amendments but limit
the type or timing of amendments which are permissible. There are
many examples of closed and restrictive rules in the Dáil. Perhaps the
best example of a closed rule is that, contrary to the legislative process
in most parliaments, the Dáil must take a yes/no vote on the general
principles of a bill before that bill is examined in detail by committee
and before any amendments may be proposed. This is considered to
close off, or at least to reduce, the possibility of any substantial
changes being made by parliament (Döring, 1995). 
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Item four addresses expansive and sequencing rules. These permit
the agenda setter to propose amendments that are prohibited to other
actors or to propose amendments at times when others may not do so.
It is argued that expansive rules which give the government the power
to introduce late amendments enable governments to maintain control
over their bills. A clear example of this practice in the Dáil procedures
is the rule which forbids opposition members from proposing
legislation or proposing amendments to legislation which incur a
charge. Specifically, under Dáil standing orders, a bill which involves
‘the appropriation of revenue or other public moneys, other than
incidental expenses’ may not be initiated by any member, save a
member of government. Where the ‘appropriation of revenue or other
public money’ is involved, including ‘incidental expenses’, the com -
mittee stage of the bill must not be taken, in accordance with Dáil
Standing Order 179(2) of 2016, unless the purpose of the appropria -
tion has been recommended to the Dáil by a message from the govern -
ment, and the text of any message must be printed on the Order Paper.
Further, under Dáil Standing Order 179(3) of 2016, ‘an amendment to
a Bill which could have the effect of imposing or increas ing a charge
upon the revenue may only be moved by a Member of the
Government or a Minister of State’. And under Dáil Standing Order
180 of 2016, a motion to grant money for the public service can be
initiated only by a member of the government. Further more, any
motion to grant money must be decided without amendment. 
Finally, item five is concerned with vote counting and voting order
rules. Voting procedures determine how votes are cast and the
requirements for winning a vote (a simple or an absolute majority), as
well as the sequencing of votes where more than one vote is necessary
for a decision to be made. 
Parliamentary control can operate via various institutional
mechanisms. The most widely used are prime minister’s question time
(Müller & Sieberer, 2014, p. 323) and investigations undertaken by
parliamentary committees. Little empirical or conceptual work has
examined how variation in the rules around parliamentary questions
strengthen or weaken parliament’s control of government – i.e. its
ability to monitor and get answers about the executive’s policy and
how it is implementing its legislative and policy programme (Müller &
Sieberer, 2014) – but it is agreed that these rules are important,
especially in how they shape the behaviour of legislators (Hug, 2010;
Hug et al., 2015). Müller & Sieberer (2014) suggest that, provided
both oral and written questions are permitted, the effectiveness of
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questions as an instrument of control depends on whether the rules
impose constraints on the type and subject of a question, and whether
there are means to enforce good-quality answers to parliamentary
questions. As the speaker is generally assigned a role in ensuring the
latter, rules about how the speaker is selected and the extent to which
he/she sees his/her position as neutral or as an agent of the govern -
ment, and/or has genuine power to force ministers to answer
questions, become important. Prior to reforms, Dáil standing orders
privileged the government with many of these instruments of agenda-
setting power, again reinforcing the govern ment’s dominance within
agenda-setting rules.
Using the research literature on parliaments to benchmark the Dáil
gives a clear indication of the extent of the centralisation of parliament
in Ireland. Evaluating the Dáil along the five dimensions of agenda
setting demonstrates that the ‘puny parliament’ description was not
unwarranted. The benchmarking also serves to highlight the validity of
the arguments about Dáil reform which were articulated in the lead up
to the 2011 election and to a lesser extent at the 2016 election. There
was an overwhelming case for Dáil reform.
Why did political reform happen at last?
If there was an overwhelming case for Dáil reform in 2011, it was
hardly new. The design and operation of the Dáil were heavily
influenced by the British Westminster model, as were other anglo -
phone parliaments such as those in Canada and Australia. While these
countries, and indeed Britain itself, have seen their parliamentary
practices evolve, the Dáil retained many originally nineteenth century
rules and practices well into the twenty-first century. The epithet ‘puny
parliament’ was given to the Dáil by Basil Chubb (1992), but indeed
almost all analyses of parliament in Ireland highlight its dominance by
the executive and associated weak capacity for oversight and poor
opportunities for legislators to influence the law-making process.
There are institutional explanations for executive dominance.
Government and parliament are fused, with ministers simultaneously
serving as TDs. The state’s role has grown in breadth and complexity,
which makes parliament’s task of holding the government to account
more difficult. Furthermore, the presence of highly disciplined parties
in parliament, where deviation from the party line is punished, reduces
the likelihood of open debate and robust challenging of policy
positions advocated by the government.
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Importantly, it has been generally agreed among political scientists
and commentators, including many TDs, that the Dáil is weaker vis-à-
vis the executive than is the case in other Westminster-style
parliaments, and certainly than is the case in the more consensus-
seeking parliaments of Europe. Garritzmann (2017) demonstrates
that the opposition has a very weak capacity to control the
government, although the Dáil scores better for the opposition’s
ability to present alternative policies. It is accepted that parliamentary
procedure – meaning the set of rules and institutions which govern the
interaction between the legislature and the executive, and which
outline how parliament goes about its business – contributes
significantly to this weakness. The received wisdom that parliamentary
procedure lies at the core of the problem of executive dominance in
Ireland is an important point. Cox & McCubbins (1997; 2005) argue
that procedural rules usually reflect the interests of the governing
majority, which in essence means that the weakness of the Dáil is a
function of the rules on how it conducts its own business.
Parliamentary procedure has facilitated almost exclusive government
control of the agenda, limiting the impact of parliament on policy
outcomes, the extent of legislative scrutiny, and the extent to which the
legislature can control the executive and hold it to account. In his
assessment of procedures in the Dáil, Caffrey (2010, p. 257) argues
that ‘standing orders have changed only very gradually and often in an
unstructured way’. This sets the Dáil apart from many other
parliaments around the world. In contrast, Sieberer et al. (2011, p.
948) concluded that ‘parliamentary rules are changed frequently and
massively’. This raises the important question of what changed in the
lead-up to the thirty-first Dáil to shift the interests of the governing
majority towards long-avoided but much-needed reform.
There were concerns about the functioning of Ireland’s political
institutions and the nature of electoral politics long before the
economic crisis developed in 2008, but to an extent economic
prosperity kept these worries at bay. Political reform became an
important part of the debate in the lead-up to the 2011 general
election. It was the first time that political reform made it onto the
agenda in a substantive manner. There was a shared narrative on the
problems which beset the political system. These included cronyism,
localism, sub-optimal decision-making and executive dominance.
Reports on the origins of the economic crisis by both domestic and
international experts cited problems such as the small and overlapping
nature of political elites and, stemming from this, a tendency for
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groupthink, weak political institutions and poor policy oversight to
emerge (Regling & Watson, 2010; TASC, 2010). 
All of the political parties included sections on political reform in
their manifestos and some produced separate, more extensive texts,
which were published before the election was formally called (Suiter
& Farrell, 2011). There was considerable mobilisation on the issue,
with civil society groups, business leaders, academics and the media
putting forward reform plans. The essential focus of all proposals was
to strengthen political institutions and transform electoral politics.
Dáil reform was a key component of all of the manifestos.
Manifestos are important documents and often form the basis of
the programme for government. Commitments which are included in
the programme for government have a high chance of being
implemented (Costello et al., 2016). The 2011 programme for
government included a detailed list of political reforms, and Dáil
reform was included as a discrete category, although, as can be seen
from Table 3, several included items related to the role of parliament.
Table 3: Political reform legislative commitments summary – 
2011 programme for government
Section Number of 
commitments
We will ensure our government is seen to be held to account 7
We will overhaul the way politics and government work 20
Showing leadership 3
Dáil reform 14
More effective financial scrutiny 26
The national parliament and the European Union 11
Reforming local government 10
Total 91
Dáil reform had comprehensively become part of the political
agenda. But there were significant political impediments to reform in
2011. Though it spoke of a ‘democratic revolution’, the new Fine
Gael/Labour government’s massive majority, coupled with the difficult
agenda of cuts that was to a large extent dictated by the troika, meant
that it was disinclined to cede much power to parliament. If anything,
power became more centralised, as the Economic Management
Council took some power from cabinet (O’Malley & Martin, 2017)
and the government was more willing to use guillotine powers than its
predecessors had been (see McGee, 2010). However, Dáil reform was
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considered by the Constitutional Convention and a number of the
proposals recommended by the convention were included in the
package of reform measures progressed by the government in early
2016. These reforms had been in planning for some time and included
direct election of the Ceann Comhairle, use of the d’Hondt electoral
mechanism for appointment of committee chairs and agreement by
the Taoiseach to appear before the working group of committee
chairs.
Dáil reform was again on the agenda after the February 2016
election, but on this occasion it was the fragmented outcome of the
election and the expected establishment of a minority government
which meant that business as usual – executive dominance – was
neither possible nor practical. Even with no rule changes, the position
of the government vis-à-vis the Dáil was considerably weakened. The
opposition now wanted to institutionalise parliamentary reform in
advance of government formation negotiations (see O’Malley, 2016).
Reform moved from being an academic discussion to an immediate
necessity. This development accords with much research which shows
that increasing fragmentation of politics and ideological polarisation
are associated with more decentralised agenda control (Diermeier &
Vlaicu, 2011; Diermeier et al., 2015). The thirty-second Dáil
established a Sub-Committee on Dáil Reform, chaired by the Ceann
Comhairle, which, on the basis of submissions received from all
parties, groups and some individual TDs, discussed and agreed
fundamental reforms to standing orders, which were subsequently
approved by the Dáil.
In all, fourteen deputies made individual submissions while eight
submissions were received from parties or groups and one by a private
citizen. A further five submissions were received in April, after the
initial deadline. Thus, in total, twenty-three submissions were
received. Following two initial meetings, an interim report was laid
before the Dáil and interim statements taken. Some twenty members
contributed to the debate.1 A further eight meetings resulted in the
draft final report and the sub-committee also agreed to review the
operation of the new proposals some six and twelve months later. The
sub-committee continues to meet regularly and, in effect, reviews the
operation of standing orders on an ongoing basis. 
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The reforms 
There is considerable consensus in the literature on parliament in
Ireland that government control of the agenda is a major contributory
factor to executive dominance. Until 2016 the effective direct
appointment of the Ceann Comhairle by the government underpinned
the strong sense that decisions taken by the chair were not always
impartial and independent of government. The benchmark exercise in
this article highlighted the specific ways in which Dáil procedures and
practices undermine the independence of the Dáil as parliament. In
this section we review the reforms which were implemented during the
terms of the thirty-first and thirty-second Dáileanna, focusing again on
the position of the Ceann Comhairle and on agenda-setting powers
and procedures. 
Seán Ó Fearghaíl became the first person to be elected into the
position of Ceann Comhairle by secret ballot when the thirty-second
Dáil met. There were five candidates for the post. The new rules
agreed prior to the election required that candidates had to be
members of the Dáil and be nominated by at least seven TDs. Each
TD could nominate just one candidate. The election took place by
secret ballot, an important feature of the new change as it ensured that
parliamentarians had more scope to select a chair of their preference.
This is especially important in the Dáil, where party discipline is high.
Indeed, in contrast to the initially open position advocated by many of
the parties when the secret ballot process for Ceann Comhairle was
being discussed in January 2016, some political parties – Fianna Fáil
and Sinn Féin – operated an internal pre-selection process to choose
a party candidate for the election, deviating somewhat from the spirit
of the reform.
Direct election of the Ceann Comhairle is crucial in a number of
ways. It ensures that the candidate elected is acceptable to a majority
of TDs and the election also removes the postholder from the direct
orbit of government. Cinn Comhairlí have long been criticised for
being ‘creatures of the government’ by virtue of their direct
appointment by the Taoiseach. Breaking that link was an important
step in enhancing the independence and autonomy of the Ceann
Comhairle. Interviews conducted for this article suggest that the
reform expectations have been met, and both government and
opposition TDs agree that the Ceann Comhairle is seen as
independent of government and carrying greater authority. An
important interacting point though is that Seán Ó Fearghaíl is a
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member of Fianna Fáil and not drawn from the governing party, a
feature which is seen as enhancing his independence.
Prior to the 2016 Dáil reform, the Taoiseach had the exclusive right
to set the plenary agenda, a right generally implemented on his behalf
by the government party whip(s). Opposition parties could only
influence the agenda through their proposals for private members’
time (which had limited time slots that could be taken over by
government business on announcement by the Taoiseach). 
One of the most fundamental reforms agreed by the thirty-second
Dáil was to remove the Taoiseach’s prerogative to set the Dáil’s
agenda. A Business Committee was established that is representative
of all of the groups in parliament, and it has been given responsibility
for agreeing weekly agendas and planning sessional ones. Under the
revised standing orders, the Business Committee, which is chaired by
the Ceann Comhairle, meets to agree and publish an agenda for the
following week. At the meeting the government determines the
business for government time, the business for opposition groups and
the business to be taken in private members’ time (the time for which
has been substantially increased). The committee initially agreed a
60/40 split of time for government/opposition business. This time split
is coming under strain as the government has found it has limited time
for its own legislation, and it would be unlikely to survive a majority
government with significantly more legislation being brought to the
Houses. 
The Business Committee aims to make decisions by consensus;
however, if the Ceann Comhairle judges that there is no consensus,
he/she may call for a vote. A rapporteur from the Business Committee
announces the business at the ‘Order of Business’ on Tuesdays and the
House decides on the proposed agenda for each day. Where urgent
items arise, the government chief whip may propose to the House
that this business be taken. Using Döring’s categorisation system, the
Irish parliament would now sit firmly in category IV. This is a
significant movement along the spectrum (presented in Table 1).
While standing orders give the Ceann Comhairle a far greater role in
setting the agenda and the right to decide if there is consensus in the
Business Committee, it does not give him/her the right to make a
decision in the event that parties cannot agree (as is the case, for
example, in Finland). The establishment of the Business Committee
has created transparency around the legislative planning process, by
bringing it into parliament and involving all sides of parliament in the
process. 
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The ability to restrict discussion time for bills is also an important
aspect of scheduling. In the bulk of Europe’s parliaments there has to
be some form of cross-party consensus before a guillotine can be
applied. In spite of its intentions to reduce the use of the guillotine, the
2011–16 government continued to use it extensively. In assigning the
legislative agenda to the Business Committee, including what
legislation is considered and how and when it is considered, the
opportunities for unilaterally imposing a guillotine have been reduced
in the thirty-second Dáil. In its report, the Sub-Committee on Dáil
Reform (2016) announced that gaps of two weeks should be required
between stages, and that committee and report stages could not be
held on the same day unless otherwise agreed (p. 8 – i.e. agreed
through the Business Committee). As such, the Business Committee is
tasked with programming legislation, although this process is at an
early stage in the Houses of the Oireachtas and is under discussion
with the committee of chairs. Standing orders still give the government
chief whip the right to propose the taking of urgent business (which
could potentially be a bill), notwithstanding the agenda agreed by the
Business Committee. The approval of the chamber is required,
however. Returning to Döring’s (1995) classification system, the Dáil
would also move along the spectrum and, specifically in relation to the
classifications presented in Table 2, the Dáil would now be included in
category III. Thus, Dáil reforms have had the impact of reducing
government control. 
In relation to proposal rights and gatekeeping rules, prior to the
2016 reforms, the Dáil would have been located in the middle of the
spectrum as parties or groups with a minimum of seven members were
in a position to table legislation but with the limitation that only one
item per order paper was allowed. There were no restrictions on the
proposal rights of the government. Under the package of reforms
agreed at the start of the thirty-second Dáil, the number of Dáil
deputies required to form a parliamentary group was reduced to five
and the limit on the number of technical groups was removed. There
was (and continues to be) some dispute about this, as the larger
opposition parties feel they are unfairly treated in the time allocations.
The combination of these changes means that there are more
groups empowered to propose legislation. Furthermore, procedures
incentivise the introduction of private members’ bills (PMBs) over
motions, as bills allow deputies more time. At the time of writing,
there were 114 PMBs before the House, compared to 28 government
bills. Resourcing changes mean that all technical groups now have
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access to administrative supports similar to those available to political
parties, and this measure should address some of the technical
challenges which non-aligned deputies faced in engaging effectively
with the legislative process. During the thirty-second Dáil it was
privately acknowledged that some PMBs fell short of the standard
expected of bills in a parliament. Poorly designed PMBs were
crowding out those good ones with the potential of garnering the
support of the Oireachtas. It was agreed that some form of legal and
parliamentary support would be needed. To that end, a legal advisory
service will be set up to assist deputies with drafting legislation and
give alternative legal advice to that offered by the government, coming
from the Attorney General. There is also a view held in some quarters
that the new arrangements for PMBs favour smaller, more radical
parties as they have more opportunities to bring forward PMBs and
their bills receive more media coverage than the more prosaic matters
often considered by the centrist parties.2
Turning to closed and restrictive rules, the principles of a bill are
agreed in plenary session and subsequent amendments proposed
cannot be contrary to the general principles of the bill. These rules
remain in place, but pre-legislative scrutiny was introduced during the
thirty-first Dáil whereby ministers were obliged to publish the general
schemes of bills, and this reduced the impact of the closed rule. For
PMBs that pass second stage, a new scrutiny stage has been introduced
under Dáil Standing Order 141 of 2016; this allows a committee to
scrutinise the bill and report back to the Dáil before the formal line-
by-line committee stage commences. 
In relation to expansive rules and sequencing rules, the Dáil falls on
the strict or centralised end of the spectrum for this category. Thus,
very little has changed as a result of recent reforms. In the specific case
where a bill incurs a charge on the state, only members of the
government may propose amendments (minister or minister for state).
While the financial initiative of government is protected in the
Constitution,3 the question of relaxing the restrictions on the right of
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ordinary members to introduce amendments and bills4 incurring a
charge was considered by the Committee on Arrangements for
Budgetary Scrutiny (a temporary committee established to report on
how the Committee on Budgetary Scrutiny should engage in
budgetary scrutiny). There are procedural options for relaxing the
restrictions (within the constitutional framework), which would
provide space to discuss amendments ruled out of order. There may
also be the possibility of allowing non-government bills which incur a
charge to proceed beyond committee stage, but not to pass without a
money message, a procedure adopted by the New Zealand parliament
in 1996.5 The Sub-Committee on Dáil Reform had not proposed
substantial procedural changes at the time of writing. 
While the right of financial initiative remains with the government,
it has agreed to release information earlier to enable enhanced
scrutiny of the budgetary process by the newly established Committee
on Budgetary Oversight.6 This is populated by the finance
spokespersons of the parties and is expected to deal with spending
decisions ex ante, where the PAC deals with them ex post. It will be
dependent on the imminent formation of a Parliamentary Budget
Office for technical support.
There was also an attempt to separate committee time and plenary
time, with distinct slots for each. This has already come under strain,
as certain debates were scheduled for longer than there was time
available, and so the Dáil plenary session had to schedule debates for
what was meant to be committee time. Reforms of vote counting and
vote order have also been agreed in the Dáil. Votes are now clustered
into a single session every week. This reform was influenced by the
need to allocate specific time for committee business and to eliminate
the requirement of TDs to leave committees to vote, which was a
regular part of the practice in previous Dáileanna. The new block
voting and electronic voting system allows formal abstentions to be
recorded, which also required a change to the standing orders. Block
voting also means that traditional late-night votes no longer occur,
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removing the need for TDs to attend late at night, leading some to
complain that Leinster House has lost some of its atmosphere. 
Conclusion – Institutionalised or temporary power?
The reforms made in the thirty-first and thirty-second Dáileanna
represent the most substantial changes to the operation of the Dáil
since it was formed. These changes shift Ireland substantially on the
scale of government control of the parliament (Farrell & Suiter, 2016).
In particular, the election of the Ceann Comhairle by secret ballot, the
creation of the Business Committee, pre-legislative scrutiny and the
allocation of committee chairs on the basis of proportionality can
strengthen the parliament. Using existing legislative benchmarks, it is
clear that there have been important improvements and the Dáil is
now a less centralised parliament, especially in relation to its ability to
determine its own agenda. Another notable change is the absence of
rows on the floor of the House. Many of these had been caused by
disputes over technicalities in the procedures, often leading to
members being ordered to leave the chamber.
However, at the first anniversary of the election of the thirty-second
Dáil, many political commentators lamented that the Dáil was working
less well than before. The consensual system meant that the Dáil was
slower in coming to agreement on issues. Critics pointed in particular
to the low number of Acts passed in 2016. Notwithstanding the fact
that the number of Acts passed is always low in an election year, 2016’s
number was particularly low. In these commentators’ minds, this
measure demonstrated the failure of ‘New Politics’ (as the new
arrangements came to be known). Their criticisms conflated two
important changes evident in 2016: a minority government, unable to
expect to command a majority in the Dáil, and significant reform of
Dáil procedures. 
There are problems with the new rules; for instance, they give too
much time to the opposition’s business and do not allow government
enough time for the opposition to oversee and monitor government
legislation. But it is incorrect to blame the rules for the requirement by
the government to engage in extensive cross-party discussion on
legislation to ensure it is progressed. Rather, this is a function of the
minority arithmetic and, no doubt, caution on the part of ministers in
bringing bills to the Oireachtas until they have a reasonable prospect
of progression. Greater discussion and evaluation of legislation in the
Dáil had long been petitioned for. It remains to be seen whether this
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is resulting in the slowing down and dilution of necessary reforms or
delivering more considered and effective governance. To make a real
assessment of the impact of the rule changes, we will need to see how
the new Dáil procedures work under coalition governments which
have a majority. 
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